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HOW THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AFFECTS 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
by 
* John Paul 
INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management has been on the rise. The recent 
corporate accounting scandals involving large well-known 
companies such as Enron, W orldCom, Xerox and Tyco - all 
audited by large accounting firms - suggest serious 
deficiencies in the accounting standards and corporate 
governance and regulatory systems designed to guide and 
monitor the financial information process. 1 While large firms 
may have received more media attention, financial statement 
fraud occurred more frequently in smaller companies 
(companies with total assets of less than $100 million) than 
larger ones. 2 
Since earnings management has been on the rise, a 
definition of earnings management is in order. Earnings 
management is when managers alter their entities' accounting 
and financial information by using their discretion in financial 
reporting and transaction structuring. 
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Firm-specific data corroborates the use of earnmgs 
management by corporations. The number of earnmgs 
restatements by listed companies, often after admitted 
irregularities, has tremendously increased in the last several 
years.3 [n addition, the frequency of firms beating analyst's 
earnings forecasts has increased sharply in the 1990s, 
suggesting earnings management as a possible cause.4 Lev and 
Zarowin provide evidence that the usefulness of reported 
earnings, cash flows, and equity values has been deteriorating 
for two decades. 5 
One common form of earnings management is the use of 
discretionary accruals.6 Under accrual-basis accounting, 
transactions that change a firm's financial statements are 
recorded in the same periods in which the events occur. Under 
the accrual basis, revenues are recognized when earned rather 
than when the cash is actually received and expenses are 
recognized when incurred rather than when the cash is paid. On 
an accrual basis, information presented reveals relationships 
likely to be important in predicting future results. 
Under cash-basis accounting, revenues are recorded only 
when received in cash and expenses are recorded only when 
paid in cash. Cash-basis accounting does not properly match 
earned revenues with expenses and is not in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Cash basis 
accounting is justified for individuals and small companies 
because they usually have few receivables and payables but 
most companies use accrual-basis accounting. 7 Accruals, in 
particular, are the non-cash items that determine regular 
accounting income.8 
By their very nature, accruals require subjective judgments 
and estimation. Before they are reali zed, accruals are difficult 
for auditors to objectively verify.9 Determining what 
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component of accruals is 
empirical models have 
discretionary accruals. 10 
discretionary is also difficult but 
been developed to measure 
Researchers have found many incentives for usmg 
discretionary accruals as a form of earnings management. 
Many corporate contracts use accounting information as a 
means of assessing whether the contract terms are being 
followed. For example, in some employment contracts, firm 
managers do not receive any bonuses in years where their firms 
suffer losses or where certain earnings targets are not met. 11 
These types of contracts provide incentives for managers to 
inflate earnings in order to receive the maximum amount of 
compensation that may be available to them. 
There are also regulatory incentives for using discretionary 
accruals. In the United States some industries, such as the 
banking, insurance and utility industries, face regulation that is 
specifically tied to numbers. ln particular, banks are required 
by regulation to maintain certain capital adequacy requirements 
while utility companies are rate-regulated and allowed to earn 
only a normal return on invested assets. These regulations 
provide incentives to manage the financial statement 
variables. 12 Evidence indicates that banks close to mmtmum 
capital requirements recognize abnormal realized gams on 
securities portfolios. 13 
This leads to the issue of how a fraud-based legal ruling 
would impact the managerial incentive for earnings 
management using discretionary accruals. Arguably, a ruling 
would decrease the incentive for using discretionary accruals 
since firm managers would not want to go through the ordeal 
of another legal action; yet, it can also be argued that such a 
ruling may provide more incentives for managers to use 
discretionary accruals since the legal case has been concluded 
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and the managers are faced with trying to place the corporation 
into a more favorable light in the eyes of stakeholders (i.e., 
creditors, stockholders, employees). 
This study empirically examines how fraud-based legal 
rulings impact discretionary accruals. The results indicate that 
the magnitude of a firm's discretionary accruals decreases in 
response to the issuance of a favorable fraud-based legal ruling 
and increases in response to the issuance of an unfavorable 
fraud-based legal ruling. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
A sample of firms facing fraud-based legal rulings was 
selected by searching the Commerce Clearinghouse Federal 
Securities Law Reports for the years 1982 to 2007. Accounting 
data needed to estimate accruals 14 was obtained from the 
Compustat Industrial Quarterly database. 
The main proxy for client managers' reporting flexibility 
are the income-increasing discretionary accruals estimated 
using the Modified Jones model because while other models 
may provide better results in certain manipulation tests, the 
Modified Jones model is consistently better overall for 
measuring discretionary accruals and in detecting earnings 
management than other models are. 15 The Modified Jones 
model estimates discretionary accruals 
(DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALS) as the prediction error 
from firm-specific ordinary least square regressions: 
(1) TOTAL_ACCRUALSit = Ao + At(A REVit- A RECit) + 
A2(PPEit) + Eit 
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where: 
TOTAL_ACCRUALSu = !1 Current assets, - !1 Cash, - !1 
Current liabilities, + !1 Current portion of long-term debt, -
Depreciation and amortization expense,; 
Ao = the intercept or an item of the regression equation 
the criterion score when all the predictor variables 
are zero ; 
A REV it = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
A REC1 =receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1; 
PPEit =gross property, plant and equipment in year t; 
Eit = prediction errors; 
i = l .. n firm index; and 
t = l .. T(i) year index for the number of years included in the 
estimation period for firm i. 
DISCRETIONARY _ACCRUALS are the prediction 
errors (cit) from applying the Modified Jones model to estimate 
normal accruals in the year of the legal ruling: 
(2) DISCRETIONARY_ACCRUALSit = 
TOTAL_ACCRUALSit- Ao + A,(A REVit- A RECt) + 
PPEit 
The discretionary accruals model specifies four control 
variables and two categorical variables. The four control 
variables represent earnings growth, firm growth, firm leverage 
and firm size. The two categorical variables are independent 
dummy variables used to account for the effect that the filing 
of a legal action and the issuance of a legal ruling have m 
predicting the dependent variable of discretionary accruals. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 summarizes the mean, standard deviation as well as 
the minimum and maximum values for the dependent and 
independent variables categorized by type of ruling - favorable 
and unfavorable. Table 2 summarizes the value of the 
regression coefficients, which indicate how much change 
occurs in the dependent variable of discretionary accruals for a 
one-unit change in the particular independent variable. 
Table 1 reveals that the firms that received unfavorable 
rulings had a wider range of discretionary accruals when 
compared with the firms that received favorable rulings . Table 
2 reveals that the companies with unfavorable rulings increased 
the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals by 80.27% 
[(72.1394- 40.0185)140.0185%] in the period after the 
issuance of the unfavorable legal ruling when compared to the 
period before the issuance of that ruling while the companies 
with favorable rulings decreased the use of income-increasing 
discretionary accruals by 96.26 percent [(12.9523 
346.7699)1346.7699%] in a direct comparison of the (RULING 
= -1) and (RULING = 0) variables. 
These results indicate that when companies prevail in fraud-
based legal actions against them, they are more likely to 
decrease the use of discretionary accruals while companies that 
lose in fraud-based legal actions against them are more likely 
to increase the use of discretionary accruals. Perhaps the 
companies with favorable rulings are relieved at the fact they 
have won the fraud-based legal action and decrease the use of 
discretionary accruals so they won ' t have to face another such 
action again. Furthermore, the companies with unfavorable 
rulings now have to deal with a loss of trust among corporate 
stakeholders as a result of losing the legal action and use 
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discretionary accruals in order to provide a more impressive 
financial picture of the company so as to minimize the impact 
of the unfavorable ruling. 
TABLE 1: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
FOR 
COMPANIES 
WITH 
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE 
RULINGS 
Companies with Favorable Rulings 
Sample = 2 7 Companies 
Variable Minimum Maximum 
FEarn Growth -887.6204 130.6226 
FGrowth -0.8064516 8.709299 
FLeverage 0 7.31992 
FSize -0.1432711 5.979368 
DiscAccr -21,455.4 22,146.85 
Companies with Unfavorable Rulings 
Samole = 42 Companies 
Variable Minimum Maximum 
FEarn Growth -1,598 92.17647 
FGrowth -0.9851179 4.738058 
FLeverage 6.849315 21.1 
FSize -1.920819 5.922928 
DiscAccr -44,445 .42 32,965.52 
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TABLE 2: 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR 
THE RULING VARIABLES 
RULING 
TYPE RULING=-1 RULING=O 
Favorable 346.7699 12.9523 
Unfavorable 40.0185 72.1394 
CONCLUSION 
The use of earnings management has been on the rise for the 
past two decades. Earnings management is when managers 
alter corporate financial reports by exercising their discretion 
over and financial issues. The use of discretionary 
accruals IS a popular form of earnings · management because 
are for independent auditors to verify since they 
mvolve subjective managerial estimates. Empirical models 
have been developed to measure the discretionary component 
of accruals. 
Since there are empirical models that can measure 
discretionary accruals, the next step is to determine the 
incentives for the use of discretionary accruals. Studies of 
incentives include contractual and regulatory 
mcentlves among others. This study examines the incentives of 
firms to use discretionary accruals after they have received 
fraud-based legal rulings from a court or enforcement 
authority. 
For the purposes of this study, a discretionary accrual model 
was formulated to test whether the magnitude of a firm ' s 
75 I Vol27 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
discretionary accruals increases or decreases after the issuance 
of a fraud-based legal ruling. The results indicate that overall, 
the magnitude of a firm's discretionary accruals decreases in 
response to the issuance of a favorable fraud-based legal ruling 
and increases in response to the issuance of an unfavorable 
fraud-based legal ruling. 
It woul.d seem that a firm that has received an unfavorable 
legal ruling may have no choice but to continue to use 
discretionary accruals in order to reduce its .political visibility. 
According to the political cost hypothesis, 1 a firm's reported 
earnings may increase its political visibility, which increases 
that firm's regulatory costs, bookkeeping costs, taxes and wage 
claims. As a result, a firm that has been issued an unfavorable 
legal ruling may use discretionary accruals to reduce its costs 
and political visibility among the stakeholders. 18 
In light of this study, independent auditors may need to 
address certain issues when dealing with firms that have just 
received fraud-based legal rulings. They should carefully 
examine managerial decisions that involve subjective estimates 
such as the Allowance for Bad Debts (or Allowance for 
Doubtful Accounts) to see if these decisions were made 
recently. The independent auditors should ask for extensive 
documentation and detailed explanations to support subjective 
managerial estimates. If these estimates appeared to have 
changed around the time the legal ruling was issued, the 
auditors should investigate further into the reasons for this 
change and why it coincided with the legal ruling. 
Overall, this study provides useful information about the 
impact of the legal process on earnings management and the 
reliability of financial statements. An examination of the role 
that litigation plays in the accounting information process is 
necessary in order to increase the quality of such information 
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especially in a world characterized by increasing amounts of 
litigation. 
1 B. Lev, Corporate earnings: Facts and fiction, JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES at 27-50 (Spring, 2003). 
2 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
published in the JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY (September, 1999). 
3 M. Wu, Earnings restatements: A capital market perspective, Working 
paper, New York University (2002); Lev, supra, note I; G. Guzeit and D. 
Li, Are we safe from financial reportingfrauds? 23-5 AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE JOURNAL 34 (June, 2004). 
4 D. Matsumoto, Reporting on the past: A new approach to improving 
accounting today, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS at 315-322 (December, 
2000); Lev, supra, note I . 
5 B. Lev and P. Zarowin, The boundaries of financial reporting and how to 
extend them, 37 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH at 353-385 
(Autumn, 1999). 
6 S.B. Jackson and M.K. Pitman., Auditors and earnings management, THE 
CPA JOURNAL (September, 2001): Available at http://www.nysscpa.org; 
D.V. Dooley, Financial fraud: Accounting theory and practice, 8 
FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE AND FINANCIAL LAW 53 
(2002). 
7 J.J. Weygandt, D.E. Kieso and P.O. Kimmel, ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES, 71h ed., New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (2005) at 90-
91. 
8 G. D'Avolio, E. Gildor and A. Shleifer, Technology, information 
production and market efficiency. Discussion Paper Number 1929, Harvard 
Institute of Economic Research of Harvard University (September, 200 I). 
9 Jackson and Pitman, supra, note 6. 
10 J. Jones, Earnings management during import relief investigations, 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH at 193-228 (Autumn, 1991 ); 
P.M. Dechow, R.G. Sloan and A.P. Sweeney, Detecting earnings 
management, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW at 193-225 ( 1995); S.H. 
Kang, and K. Sivaramakrishnan, Issues in testing earnings management and 
an instrumental variable approach, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH at 353-367 (Autumn, 1995); X. Garza-Gomez, M. Okumara 
and M. Kunimura, Discretionary accrual models and the accounting 
process, Working Paper Series (October, 1999); K.V. Peasnell, P. F. Young 
and S. Young, Detecting earnings management using cross-sectional 
77 I Vo127 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
abnormal accrual models, 30 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS 
RESEARCH at 313-326 (2000); J. Thomas and X. Zhang, IdentifYing 
unexpected accruals: A comparison of current approaches, 19 JOURNAL 
OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY at 347-376 (2000). 
11 P. Healy, The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions, 7 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS at 85-107 (1985); R. 
Holthausen, D. Larcker and R. Sloan, Annual bonus schemes and the 
manipulation of earnings, 19 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND 
ECONOMICS at 29-74 ( 1995); F. Guidry, A. Leone and S. Rock, 
Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business unit 
managers, 26 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS at 113-
142 (January, 1999); D. M. Schizer, Executives and hedging: The fragile 
!ega/foundation of incentive compatibility, I 00 COLUMBIA LAW 
REVIEW 440 (March, 2000) 
12 P.M. Healy and J.M. Wahlen, A review of the earnings management 
literature and its implications for standard setting, 13 ACCOUNTING 
HORIZONS at 365-383 (December, 1999); C. A. Hill, Why financial 
appearances might matter: An explanation/Or "dirty pooling" and some 
other types of financial cosmetics 22 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE LAW 141 (1997). 
13 S. Moyer, Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in 
commercial bank, 12 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
at 123-154 (1990); M. Scholes, G. P. Wilson and M. Wolfson, Tax 
planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for 
commercial banks, 3 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES at 625-650 
( 1990); J. Collins, D. Shackelford and J. Wahlen, Bank differences in the 
coordination ofregulatory capital, earnings and taxes, 33 JOURNAL OF 
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 2 at 263-291 (1995). 
14 W.G. Heninger, The effect of earnings management on auditor litigation, 
University of Georgia doctoral dissertation ( 1991 ). 
15 P.M. Oechow, R.G. Sloan and A.P. Sweeney, Detecting earnings 
management, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW at 193-225 (April, 1995); 
F.A. Gul, C.J.P. Chen and J.S.L. Tsui, Discretionary accounting accmals, 
managers' incentives, and audit fee, CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH at 441-464 (Fall2003); J.J.A. Jaime and B.G.D.A. Noguer, 
Specification and power of cross-sectional abnormal working capital 
accruals models in the Spanish context, 13 EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING 
REVIEW at 73-104 (2004); H.Y. Lee and V. Mande, The effect of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on accounting discretion 
of client managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: A 
JOURNAL OF PRACTICE AND THEORY at 93-108 (March, 2003); M.L. 
2012 I How the Legal Environment Affects I 78 
Chai and S. Tung, The effect of earnings-announcement timing on earnings 
management, 29 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FfNANCE & ACCOUNTING 
(9)(10) at 1337- 1354 (November/December 2002). 
16 Laurence G. Grimm and Paul R. Yamold, READING AND 
UNDERSTANDING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS, Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association ( 1995). 
17 K.V. Wojdat, Politically motivated accounting choice and financial 
indicators of political risk: The pharmaceutical industry, State University 
of New York at Buffalo doctoral dissertation ( 1999); R. Hagerman and M. 
Zmijewski, Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice, 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS at 141-161 (August, 
1979); R.J . Bowen, J. Lacey and E. Noreen, Determinants ofthe decision by 
firms to capitalize interest costs, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND 
ECONOM ICS at 151-1 79 (August, 1981); M. Zmijewski and R. Hagerman, 
An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard 
setting/choice, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS at 
129-149 (August, 1981). 
D. Gilfedder and C. O'Hogartaigh, The grasshoppers and the great 
cattle: An exploration of participation in the ASB 's standard-setting 
process, Working paper, Dublin City University Business School (1997): 
Available at http://www.dcu.ie/dcubs/ research. 
79 I Vol 27 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
OFF-DUTY EMPLOYEE FRATERNIZATION INVADES 
THE OFFICE: 
A CASE STUDY OF DOSIS PHARMACEUTICALS 
by 
Nancy Lasher* and Donna Steslow** 
INTRODUCTION: 
Managers continue to struggle with defining appropriate 
interpersonal conduct between employees, and taking action 
when dating and relationships cross the line into a hostile work 
environment. Likewise, employment law attorneys are 
increasingly faced with giving advice in these situations and 
defining what is legal and illegal. Providing a scenario in the 
workplace involving a relationship between an administrative 
assistant and a professional can illustrate to business majors 
some of the issues raised in workplace relationships. 
This case involves employment law and HR issues arising 
out of an affair between two employees at a pharmaceutical 
plant. The case is based upon an actual situation; however, the 
names of the parties, some of the descriptive facts, and the type 
of manufacturing plant have been changed for reasons of 
confidentiality. The affair ends badly and the tension and 
animosity between the male engineer and female 
administrative assistant is affecting the morale of the entire 
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